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Abstract While the impact of tax policy and other economic variables on
the total amount of construction has been widely studied, this
article proposes that these variables also affect the size
distribution of the properties constructed. The basic intuition is
that there is a lower bound to the economically feasible size of
a project due to economies of scale in construction. Events
favorable to construction, such as lower interest rates and more
favorable tax treatment, relax this lower bound permitting the
construction of smaller properties. This proposition is tested
using data on newly constructed neighborhood shopping centers
in Clark County, Nevada from 1971 to 1999.
Introduction
This study shows that several factors, including federal tax laws, have a signiﬁcant
impact on the size distribution of newly constructed retail shopping centers. For
example, because there are economies of scale in construction, smaller properties
may be economically feasible only when tax laws are favorable to real estate
investment.1 The impact of tax laws on average property size after controlling for
the real cost of construction, the required rate of return and per capita sales is
demonstrated. Similarly, these same factors may have an impact on the standard
deviation and skewness of the size distribution. In the following section, a brief
review of the literature is presented. In the following section, the theoretical model
is presented. This is followed by a discussion of the data and empirical results.
The last section is the conclusion.80  Clauretie and Jameson
 Review of the Literature
Optimal Size
Much of the research surrounding retail shopping centers has focused on the effect
of tenant mix and anchor tenants on rental revenues, and, therefore proﬁt
maximization.2
Little research has been done pertaining to the optimal size of commercial real
estate properties. The exceptions are two studies by Gat (1995) and Colwell and
Ebrahim (1997) that look at the optimal size of ofﬁce buildings. In these studies,
rent is assumed to be invariant to the size of the structure and, because ofﬁce
buildings tend to have multiple stories, an optimal size results from the fact that
the construction cost per square foot increases with each additional story.
Shopping centers, on the other hand, are nearly all one-story structures and, as a
result, the construction cost per square foot decreases with size. The optimal size
of shopping centers results from the assumption that at some point rental revenue
per square foot must fall with additional size. The concavity of the rent function
is explained below.
The result of the mainstream research has a common, well accepted theme:
shopping center owners seek to achieve a tenant mix that is relatively
heterogeneous and include an anchor tenant for overall drawing power. The
heterogeneous mix attracts shoppers that have a desire for one-stop shopping and
reduces cutthroat price competition. The anchor tenant draws customers from
greater distances and provides the smaller tenants with additional customers. In
turn, the smaller tenants will pay a higher rent.
West, Von Hohenbalken and Kroner (1985) show that not only is the tenant mix
important but that a well-planned center optimizes the location of the tenants
within the center. They show that a well-planned center includes a proper mix of
tenants that restricts excessive replication of tenant type. Eppli (1991) and Eppli
and Shilling (1993) empirically test the effects of anchor tenant size and image
on the surrounding non-anchor tenants. Both studies show an increase in non-
anchor tenant sales from the presence of high image anchor tenants. Furthermore,
the increase in sales is prevalent for virtually every type of non-anchor tenant.3
Brueckner (1993) developed a theoretical model of inter-store externalities. Given
that the sales of a tenant are dependent not only on the space allocated to that
tenant but also to the space allocated to other tenants, the shopping center owner
can allocate space to various tenant types so as to maximize revenues. Benjamin,
Boyle and Sirmans (1990) show that shopping center owners reduce the rent of
anchor (and some non-anchor) tenants according to their ability to produce sales
revenue to the ‘‘non-producing’’ tenants by drawing customers to the center.
The research on the demand externalities of tenant mix and on anchor tenant
presence has implications for the optimal shopping center size. First, it is clearThe Effect of Tax Laws  81
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that very small shopping centers are not economically feasible. A shopping center
comprised of only a few stores would not provide for sufﬁcient tenant mix. And,
of course, there would be no beneﬁts from an anchor tenant. As the tenant mix
increases so does the size of the center. The size of the center would also increase
(discontinuously) with the addition of one or more anchor tenants. But, for obvious
reasons, the property size would not increase indeﬁnitely. First, shopping centers
tend to restrict head-to-head competition. Once the appropriate mix has been
attained, additional space would have to be allocated to competitors of other
tenants. Second, the size of each tenant space is constrained by diminishing returns
(sales per square foot decrease beyond an optimal size). Gerbich (1998) as well
as Tay, Lau, Clement and Leung (1999) both show that the rent per square foot
received by the property owner is negatively related to the size of the tenant space.
To reinforce this point one need only to observe that even in very large cities the
size of shopping centers does not increase without limit.
Tax Laws
Tax laws affect several aspects of commercial real estate. Brueggeman, Fisher and
Stern (1981) show how tax laws affect the optimal holding period for commercial
real estate. A theoretical piece by Fisher and Lentz (1986) shows that tax laws
combined with assumptions regarding how interest rates interact with inﬂation
affect the value of commercial real estate. Smith and Woodward (1996)
demonstrate empirically that after considering regional economies and vacancy
rates, the 1986 Tax Reform Act had a negative effect on the values of apartment
properties. Later Smith, Woodward and Schulman (2000) show a similar negative
effect (of the 1986 Act) on commercial ofﬁce properties.
Lentz and Fisher (1989) demonstrate that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected
the optimal organizational structure (corporation vs. partnership) in which to hold
real estate.
Liang, McIntosh and Webb (1995) report that the riskiness of real estate
investment trusts (REITs) (in terms of their return generating processes) shifted
signiﬁcantly around the dates of major tax legislation (1976, 1981, 1986). Sanger,
Sirmans and Turnbull (1990) found that proposed tax changes had signiﬁcant
effects on the returns to publicly traded real estate ﬁrms.
Thus, theoretically and empirically, it is clear that federal tax laws can affect many
attributes of commercial real estate. To date, however, there has been no research
regarding how tax laws may affect the optimal size of real estate properties. This
study suggests that favorable tax laws will allow for smaller than otherwise
properties to be constructed. This hypothesis is tested below.
 A Model of Shopping Center Size
The model of shopping center size is a hedonic pricing model, in which the size
of the site is the characteristic analyzed. In such models, equilibrium is82  Clauretie and Jameson
characterized by offer curves, reﬂecting the supply of retail space, and by bid
curves reﬂecting demand. The bid-rent curves are modeled as resulting from the
behavior of retailers or groups of retailers who rent the space as an input for their
operations. Thus, the bid-rent curve represents a derived demand for retail space.
The suppliers of this space are modeled as builder-owners who ﬁrst construct the
establishment and then operate it. The minimum before-tax rent these builder-
owners require (the offer curve) depends on factors including the cost of
construction, required return and the tax-treatment of ownership. The offer and
bid curves are expressed in per square-footage terms and deﬁne a basic static
model. Changes in exogenous variables then create a dynamic version of the
model with predictions concerning changes in the range of optimal sizes.
Supply—Offer Curves
The basic premise is that there are economies of scale in building retail shopping
facilities. This is due to the ﬁxed costs of developing a site as well as the geometric
fact that the perimeter (of a square) increases in proportion to the length of its
side while its area increases with the square of a side. Usable area is related to
the area whereas building costs depend more on the length of the wall. Thus, the
cost per square foot at which builders are able to provide new retail space declines
with the square footage of the property. Per square footage costs do not decline
to zero however, but rather asymptotically approach a minimum value.
Although the proposition that the cost per square foot declines with size seems
apparent, nonetheless empirical support was found for this relationship. The real
sales price (sales price restated in 1999 dollars) of 280 neighborhood shopping
centers sold between 1990 and 1999 in Clark County, Nevada was examined.
Assuming that in long run equilibrium the transaction price approaches the cost
of construction, the real price per square foot was regressed against the size of
the property (and lot size). The resulting equation was:
1 RPSQFT  .0185 SQFT  3490589 SQFT  .0029 LOT
(5.03)*** (6.94)*** (9.72)*** (1)
Adj. R2  .3163 F-Statistic  63.914***
t-Statistics in parenthesis, ***Signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
The results suggest that, over the relevant range, the price per square foot is
signiﬁcantly related to the size of the property and that the price per square foot
declines with size.
Next, it is assumed that in a competitive construction industry in which all builders
have access to the same technology, competition among builders will force theThe Effect of Tax Laws  83
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cost of the retail property down to the costs of construction. The result is a
builders’ offer price curve reﬂecting the economies of scale:
P  F(q, x), (2)
Where: Fq  0.
Here: p  Cash ﬂow per square foot;
q  Total square foot; and
x  Other relevant variables (e.g., construction costs).
In the inequality, the subscript denotes the partial derivative of the function, F,
with respect to the argument q. Thus, this condition indicates that the builder’s
average cost, F, declines with the size of the property; that is to say, there are
economies of scale in construction.
Demand—Bid-Rent Function
Retail properties observed in an urban area serve a variety of functions. Large
malls attract customers intent on a major shopping expedition from throughout
the region. Other, smaller, properties will be more convenience oriented providing
items that consumers may prefer to acquire more frequently and on shorter trips
nearer to their home. Still others, such as super-category stores or warehouse stores
may lie somewhere in between. For any given location there exists some value-
maximizing combination of retail activities. Furthermore, the precise nature and
combinations of retail activities may vary widely by location. In this study, the
concern is not so much of explaining why certain retail mixes occur but rather
that the ultimate size of the property that can be affected by such factors as the
tax laws.
As indicated in the literature review, it is well recognized that tenant mix and the
existence of anchor tenants is important to the economic success of a retail
property. Both factors tend to provide an incentive for larger properties. This study
treats the problem of space allocation and contracting among the tenants as being
solved in the sense that the collection of retailing activities is treated as being
carried out by a single retail ‘‘renter.’’ For multiple-user sites, the bid-rent function
of this ‘‘renter’’ is viewed as the total rent generated when the site is optimally
allocated to retail tenants according to optimally speciﬁed rent contracts. In effect,
the analysis treats the allocation and incentive problem as being internalized by a
single retailing entity, rather than being coordinated by the property owner through
rental contracts. Absorbing the allocation and contract problems into the bid-rent
function considerably simpliﬁes the exposition.84  Clauretie and Jameson
Thus, the renter in this model represents the retail activity or combination of retail
activities carried out at a given property location. As with the case of builders, it
is assumed that competition among property operators eliminates any economic
proﬁt to them.
The bid-rent function for any individual type of retailer for space at a particular
location can be derived as follows. Given the technology of this type of retailing
a ‘‘restricted proﬁt function,’’ Varian (1978:8) deﬁnes proﬁt as a function of the
prices of all other inputs (except retail space) and outputs and the amount of retail
space used.
i  (q, w, z), (3)
Where:
i  Proﬁt for retailer type i;
q  Total square feet;
w  The vector of input and output prices; and
z  Other relevant variables.
In general, the other types of relevant variables might include the characteristics
of location (trafﬁc ﬂow, for example) or characteristics of the retailer (product/
service, sales staff). The function presumes an optimal use of the space including
the number of retailers at the location and possibly anchor tenant(s).
Since restricted proﬁt is the proﬁt a renter of this type could earn using a retail
site, this function represents the maximum bid for the property, the derived
demand for its use. For consistency with the rest of the model, this bid-rent
function is more conveniently expressed in terms of the rent per square foot:
ii R(q)   (q)/q, (4)
Where Ri denotes the bid-rent function for a renter of type i, and the vectors of
price and control variables for economy of notation are surpressed.
This bid-rent function initially increases in q, has an internal maximum and
ultimately begins to decline (see Gerbich, 1998; and Tay et al. 1999) so that:
 0,  0, where subscripts again denote ﬁrst and second partial ii (R (0) R qq q
derivatives). These results are intuitive as well: a miniscule space generates no
proﬁt so that initially increasing the size adds to proﬁt. However, given a ﬁnite
customer ﬂow past a given location at some point adding space reduces the proﬁt
per square foot.The Effect of Tax Laws  85
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Exhibit 1  Bid-rent Functions for Five Distinct Types of Renters
Market Equilibrium
The interaction of the builders’ offer price curve and the renter’s bid-rent function
determine the equilibrium price per square foot of properties of various sizes. It
also determines whether a property of a given size will be built at all. Exhibit 1
illustrates an equilibrium in this market. The curves R1 to R5 represent bid-rent
functions for ﬁve distinct types of renters. Each has the inverted U-shape described
above. Those indexed with smaller numbers, represent uses for which a relatively
small size is optimal, perhaps one or a few tenants drawing a limited number of
customers. Those curves with larger indices indicate uses for which a larger space
is optimal, such as a large mall drawing from most of the region. The ﬁve curves
drawn are purely representative, in practice one would expect a very large number
of bid-rent curves interspersed between these, reﬂecting the wide variety of
potential uses for retail space. The proﬁts to a renter of any type, and thus the
location of the associated bid-rent function, depend on the degree of competition
from similar operations, because, all else equal, an increase in competition reduces
the ﬂow of customers to the site. Because of the nature of spatial competition
(customers seek out the nearest location providing the service they desire, but only
if its net value exceeds travel costs), there is some maximum proﬁt attainable even
in the absence of competition. Associated with this is a maximum bid-rent86  Clauretie and Jameson
function. The maximum bid-rent functions for the various types of renters are
denoted by the curves Ri* in Exhibit 1.
The curve FF in Exhibit 1 denotes the builder’s offer curve, Equation (1), the
minimum payment per square foot required. As indicated in the discussion of that
equation, it declines (and reaches a minimum) with size because of economies in
construction. Its position depends on the overall cost of construction, the required
rate of return and tax provisions affecting owners of property. In order to analyze
conveniently the impact of tax code changes along with these other factors, the
offer and bid curves are deﬁned in terms of before-tax dollars. Thus, the offer
curve would be shifted down by any event making construction more
advantageous: reduced construction costs, lower interest rates or more favorable
tax treatment.
As depicted in Exhibit 1, many of the no-competition bid-rent curves, Ri*, lie
above the offer curve. This means that builders would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to provide
retail space of a size appropriate for those types of renters. As building occurs,
activities of this type became more competitive and less proﬁtable, shifting down
the bid-rent functions for this type of renter. This process of building continues
until the incentive to enter these kinds of activities has been eliminated, that is to
say until the bid for a location of the optimal size just equals the builders’required
payment. This is the equilibrium depicted in Exhibit 1. For the uses favoring larger
locations, entry has occurred until the bid-rent curves have shifted downward to
the point of tangency. The upper limit of the size distribution, SU, is determined
by the location of the rightmost bid-rent function. Presumably, this reﬂects demand
from the largest scale mall the region is able to support. As discussed, its size is
limited by the regional population and technical considerations discussed
previously. However, at the lower end of the distribution, some types of renters,
speciﬁcally those indexed by 1, do not rent space and no space is built for them.
The maximum they are willing to pay, even absent competition, is less than the
minimum required by builders to provide the space. In effect, economies of scale
in construction mean that there is some minimum size below which it is not
economical to build. Thus, the lower bound of the size distribution, SL, is
determined by that type of user that can just pay for a space of the appropriate
size. In Exhibit 1, these are renters of type 2. For this marginal renter type, the
bid-rent of a renter not exposed to competition just sufﬁces to pay for the space
desired. Renters with an index less than two are not accommodated. Those with
indices greater than two, indicated by the bid-rent curves R2 through R5 enter until
a tangency results. Retail sites ranging in size from SL to SU are observed.
Comparative Statics
Exhibit 2 shows how any change in conditions that favors construction affects this
size distribution. The original equilibrium from Exhibit 1 is represented by the
builders’ offer curve, FF, the post-entry bid-rent curves for renter types seeking
larger establishments, R2 to R5, the maximum (no competition) bid-rent curve fromThe Effect of Tax Laws  87
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Exhibit 2  Conditions that Favor Construction Affect Size Distribution
renter types seeking smaller locations, such as R1*, and the resulting size
distribution SL to SU. Any event that favors the construction or ownership of
retail property, including reduced construction costs, lower interest rates and more
favorable tax treatment, will result in the willingness of builders to provide space
at a lower before-tax cost per square foot. This is reﬂected in the downward shift
of the builders’ offer curve to F’F’.
As a result of this shift, builders now ﬁnd it attractive to provide more locations
to types of renters already in operation (types indexed 2 through 5). Entry into
these activities increases competition, reducing bid-rents until equilibrium is
restored with bid-rent functions R2’ through R5’. If the shift of these curves is
approximately vertical, there will not be signiﬁcant changes in the size of property
desired by each renter type. However, the downward shift of the builder’s offer
curve has one additional effect. Some renter types, who were previously excluded
from the market, are now able to obtain space. These are renters such as type
one, who desired smaller spaces. As a result of the shift in the offer curve, builders
are now willing to provide space to such renters. The marginal renter type shifts
to the left, and the lower bound of the size distribution shifts from SL to SL’. In
essence, the lower construction cost or more favorable treatment of ownership
relaxes the lower bound imposed by economies of scale. More favorable treatment
results in an increase in construction of all types, but a greater than proportional
increase occurs in the range of smaller properties because of this effect.88  Clauretie and Jameson
In the next section, this prediction is tested by examining the impact of such
variables on the ﬁrst three moments of the size distribution of newly constructed
shopping centers (average, standard deviation and skewness). Speciﬁcally, since
any change favoring construction implies a disproportionate increase in smaller
properties built, such changes should reduce the average size of new properties.
To predict the effect on the standard deviation, note that the distribution of
construction projects is skewed (has positive skewness). That is, there are a
relatively large number of smaller projects concentrated near the left end of the
distribution, with relatively fewer large projects scattered out into the right tail.
The mean lies toward the more densely populated lower end. Since a construction-
favoring event disproportionately increases the number of small projects (those
closer to the mean), its effect will be to reduce the standard deviation. It will also
increase the skewness of the distribution. (It will lean to the left more than before.)
To summarize: any change that makes construction more attractive is predicted to
decrease the mean, decrease the standard deviation and increase the skewness of
the size distribution of newly constructed properties.
 Data and Empirical Results
The speciﬁcation is a reduced form equation containing variables affecting the
attractiveness of construction:
DESC     PRIME   COST   PCSALES t 1 t 2 t 3 t (5)
  TAX  e. 4 tt
Where:
DESCt  A description of the size distribution (average, standard deviation or
skewness) in square feet of new retail shopping properties
constructed in year t.
PRIMEt  The prime rate in year t is used as proxy for the required return on
retail properties. Since interest rates tend to move in a synchronous
fashion changes in the prime rate should reﬂect changes in the
required rate of return.
COSTt  The real cost of construction in year t.
PCSALESt  Per capita sales in year t. As per capita sales increase, so should the
proﬁtability per square foot of retail space and thus the bid-rent
function of retailers. Note this differs from an increase in sales
resulting from an increase in population inasmuch as the latter
would require the number of retail outlets to expand in proportion
to the population.4The Effect of Tax Laws  89
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Exhibit 3  Deﬁnitions of Variables
Size
Data on the size in square feet of all retail shopping properties constructed each year in Clark County,
Nevada were obtained from the Clark County Assessor’s ofﬁce.
Prime
The prime rate for each year was obtained from the Federal Reserve System data.
Cost
The real cost of construction was obtained by taking the construction cost index as reported in Engi-
neering News Record and dividing by the CPI.
PCSales  Sales/Population
Pop
The population of Clark County.
Sales
Total sales are provided by the State of Nevada and are based on sales tax receipts.
Tax
Two alternative measures of the effect of tax laws on property size are used: Capital Gains Rate, which
is the maximum capital gains tax rate, and First-Year Depreciation, which is the amount of depreciation
(as a percent) allowed in the ﬁrst year. For example, currently retail properties must be depreciated on
a straight-line basis over thirty-nine years so that the ﬁrst-year depreciation is 2.56%.
TAXt  Federal tax law regarding the capital gains rate or ﬁrst-year
depreciation allowance in year t.
et  Statistical error term.
Data
Annual data is from 1971 through 1999. Variable deﬁnitions appear in Exhibit 3.
Descriptive statistics are given in Exhibit 4.
Some observations should be made about the data. First, Clark County, Nevada
is uniquely well suited to study the behavior of new construction. Because of its
rapid growth over the last few decades, numerous shopping properties have been
added to the stock each year. In 1971, the population of the county was 293,000
and in 1999, it was 1,343,540. In 1971, there were 108 neighborhood shopping
centers in Clark County. By 1999, there were 1,022 such centers. In addition,
Clark County is an isolated local economy. This fact reduces the problem of






































1971 108 39 6.66 5.73 39.04 3,389
1972 114 10,704 45 6.66 5.25 41.94 3,773
1973 126 18,480 45 6.66 8.03 42.68 4,342
1974 140 18,306 45 6.66 10.81 40.97 4,512
1975 155 19,830 45 6.66 7.86 41.11 4,958
1976 177 15,398 49 6.66 6.84 42.20 5,434
1977 193 11,497 49 6.66 6.83 41.93 6,253
1978 229 14,412 48 6.66 9.06 42.22 7,049
1979 267 17,158 28 6.66 12.67 41.10 7,487
1980 305 17,646 28 6.66 15.26 38.81 7,184
1981 321 38,671 24 11.66 18.87 34.46 7,399
1982 329 12,546 20 11.66 14.85 39.53 7,048
1983 341 20,372 20 11.66 10.79 40.89 7,236
1984 352 9,822 20 9.70 12.04 40.05 7,624
1985 388 13,488 20 9.70 9.93 39.04 8,088
1986 422 20,065 20 9.20 8.33 39.26 8,671
1987 501 19,206 28 3.17 8.21 38.62 9,199
1988 567 21,037 33 3.18 9.32 38.25 9,691



























































1990 656 12,684 28 3.17 10.01 36.21 11,125
1991 717 33,497 28 3.17 8.46 35.37 10,105
1992 754 19,266 28 2.56 6.25 35.45 10,178
1993 789 18,665 28 2.56 6.00 36.40 11,130
1994 810 19,682 28 2.56 7.15 36.49 12,460
1995 829 23,865 28 2.56 8.83 35.64 13,071
1996 861 28,640 28 2.56 8.27 35.67 14,160
1997 906 17,163 28 2.56 8.44 36.51 14,336
1998 965 15,563 20 2.56 8.35 36.16 14,852
1999 1,022 14,363 20 2.56 8.00 36.25 15,272
Mean 18,740 31.1 5.74 9.35 38.74 8,853
Minimum 9,822 20.2 2.56 5.25 35.37 3,389
Maximum 38,671 49.0 11.66 18.87 42.68 15,272
Std. Dev. 6,475 10.0 3.11 3.06 2.41 3,43692  Clauretie and Jameson
Exhibit 5  Predicted Effect of Changes in Independent Variables on Characteristic of the Size Distribution
of Shopping Centers
Average Std. Dev. Skewness




Pre capita sales  
Capital gains rate  
First-year depreciation  
It may also be useful to clarify which types of properties are included in the data.
The Clark County Assessors Ofﬁce distinguishes three types of retail properties:
 Regional shopping centers: Large centers containing many varied retail
shops and stores that caters to buyers from all areas (Contains at least
three major stores).
 Neighborhood shopping centers: Similar to shopping centers but
contains fewer retail outlets and cater primarily to local residents.
 Retail stores and shops: Department stores dealing in a full line of
merchandise, drug stores, food and meat markets, specialty shops, shoe
and wearing apparel shops, and hardware stores.
Regional shopping centers are excluded because the focus is primarily an
examination of the impact of economic events on smaller properties. During the
sample period, the size of ‘‘retail stores and shops’’ was inﬂuenced by nationwide
trends in retailing (for example, the emergence of ‘‘category killer’’ stores and
discounters), which were not modeled. For these reasons, only data on
neighborhood shopping centers are used. This approach excludes observations
likely to be driven by forces other than those modeled here, but includes a wide
range of data. (The deﬁnition of this category tends to be very broadly
construed—verbal communication.) The average size of neighborhood centers was
18,740 square feet. The smallest average size added in any one year was 9,822
while the largest average size was 38,671.
The real construction cost index can be understood as the ratio of a price index
of goods and services used in construction (speciﬁcally the Engineering News
Record construction cost index) to a general price index (the CPI). This quantiﬁes
the extent to which construction has become more or less expensive relative to
the overall price level.
The data exhibit substantial variation, both with respect to tax policy and the










































Exhibit 6  Empirical Results
Variable Average Size Std. Dev. Skewness
Constant 107,347 76,848 332,062 335,100 10.11 24.58
(6.26)*** (3.02)*** (5.82)*** (5.33)*** (1.26) (3.11)***
Prime 1,173.47 1,089.94 1,260.70 564.52 0.240 0.332
(5.10)*** (3.74)*** (2.37)** (0.74) (2.24)** (2.68)**
Cost 2,614.63 1,440.77 8,064.65 7,617.93 0.105 0.448
(6.36)*** (2.57)** (5.68)*** (5.14)*** (0.543) (2.57)**
Per capita sales 0.674 0.904 2.772 4.140 0.0002 0.00004
(2.19)** (2.12)** (3.15)*** (3.74)*** (1.31) (0.287)
Capital gains rate 25,383 52,649 11.38
(4.02)*** (2.58)** (3.85)***
First-year depreciation 759.14 794.42 0.520
(2.04)* (0.856) (3.95)***
Adj. R2 0.6431 0.674 0.760 0.445 0.869 0.867
Durbin-Watson stat 2.039 1.855 1.864 2.034 1.686 1.578
F-Statistic 10.73*** 12.17*** 18.05*** 5.33*** 36.97*** 36.18***
Notes: Dependent variable: average size, standard deviation and skewness of neighborhood shopping centers constructed: 1972–1999. The model was
estimated assuming a ﬁrst-order moving average error structure because of correlation in the uncorrected residuals. Inspection of the correlation coefﬁcients
among the independent variables indicates there was no multicollinearity. Also, a standard White test for heteroscedasticity indicate this was not a problem.94  Clauretie and Jameson
during the period 1981 to 1986. The capital gains rate is most favorable during
almost the same period 1982 to 1986. However, interest rates are at their highest
during the period from 1978 to 1985, which includes the period of favorable tax
policy. Given the conﬂicting forces at work, multiple-regression analysis was used
to examine the impact of each variable.
Empirical Results
Of the variables included in the regression, increases in the prime rate, real
construction costs and the capital gains tax rate would be considered to be
unfavorable for construction. As discussed, each would be predicted to increase
the mean and standard deviation, but decrease the skewness of the size
distribution. Conversely, increases in per capita sales or ﬁrst year depreciation
favor construction. They should have the opposite effects.
Exhibit 5 summarizes the predictions of the model, while Exhibit 6 shows the
actual empirical results.
Of the variables for which an increase is unfavorable to construction, the prime
rate and capital gains rate behave as predicted. Mean and standard deviation
increase, while skewness decreases. The variables for which an increase is
favorable to construction, per capita consumption and ﬁrst year depreciation have
the predicted signs, although only three of the six coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant.
The construction cost coefﬁcients behave differently. Because increased cost
would be thought to reduce construction, its coefﬁcients were predicted to have
the same signs as those of the prime rate and capital gains rate. The negative and
signiﬁcant statistic in one speciﬁcation of the skewness regression is consistent
with this prediction. However, the regressions of the average and standard
deviation display coefﬁcients with the opposite sign to that predicted. One possible
explanation could be a simultaneity problem. The theory asserts that exogenous
events favorable to construction will tend to have a stronger impact on smaller
sites, reducing average size. However, the same events will lead to a general
increase in construction, and thus—if they are demand side events—also to higher
construction costs. The result could be a negative relation between size and
building costs as observed here. While consistent with the results reported here,
veriﬁcation of this explanation would require further investigation.
In general the results are supportive of the proposition that factors favoring
construction—including favorable tax laws—affect the size of construction
undertaken. The basic idea is that these favorable conditions partially overcome
the economies of scale characterizing construction to permit smaller projects to
be constructed.
The effect of tax laws and other economic factors on the total amount of
construction has been well documented. The ﬁndings indicate that these factors
inﬂuence the size distribution of construction as well.The Effect of Tax Laws  95
JRER  Vol. 24  No. 1 – 2002
 Conclusion
The empirical results conﬁrm that the factors that affect the attractiveness of
construction do have a signiﬁcant impact on the size distribution of retail
properties. The average (mean), standard deviation and skewness are all affected.
The factors that affect the size distribution include the tax laws. One deﬁnite
conclusion is that favorable tax laws encourage the construction of smaller
properties that may otherwise not be completed. Smaller parcels that would
otherwise not accommodate an economically feasible retail establishment are, in
fact, feasible with sufﬁciently favorable tax laws. Thus, it is possible to establish
that economic forces inﬂuence the size of retail shopping centers. This result
should be of interest to private developers, urban planners or anyone else with an
interest in projecting patterns of land use.
 Endnotes
1 Tax laws that are favorable to real estate investment include: lower income tax rates,
allowance for capital gains treatment and at low marginal rates, and allowance for a
greater amount of depreciation in the early years of the property’s life.
2 Those interested in a comprehensive review of the literature can reference Eppli and
Benjamin (1994).
3 The implication of this sales effect is, of course, that the shopping center owner can
charge higher rent from the non-anchor tenants.
4 The regressions were also run using various price indices to deﬂate per capita
expenditure. In all cases, they reduced the ﬁt of the model.
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